Supreme Court Oral Arguments

• [24-394] Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond

  Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 30, 2025. Petitioner: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board.Respondent: Gentner Drummond, Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma. Advocates: James A. Campbell (for the Petitioners in No. 24-394) Michael H. McGinley (for the Petitioner in No. 24-396) D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Gregory G. Garre (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gentner Drummond, the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, filed an action against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board and its members seeking to invalidate their contract with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School. St. Isidore, supported by the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa, aims to operate as a Catholic virtual charter school. In creating this contract, the Charter School Board recognized religious rights and entitlements for St. Isidore, which deviated from the standard expectation that charter schools remain nonsectarian under Oklahoma law. On June 5 and October 9, 2023, the Charter School Board approvingly voted for St. Isidore's application and contract, both by a 3-2 margin. The contract omitted standard provisions prohibiting religious affiliation while affirming St. Isidore’s religious mission, which the State contends violates the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma Charter Schools Act, and the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. Consequently, the State requested a writ of mandamus to rescind the contract, arguing that the use of public funds for a sectarian institution contravenes legal and constitutional prohibitions. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction and granted belated relief to the State, holding that the contract violated state and federal law, including constitutional provisions prohibiting government establishment of religion. Question 1. Are a privately owned and operated school’s educational decisions considered state action simply because the school has a contract with the state to provide free education to students?  2. Does the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause prohibit, or the Establishment Clause require, a state to exclude religious schools from its charter-school program?

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• [24-362] Martin v. United States

  Martin v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2025. Petitioner: Curtrina Martin.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Patrick M. Jaicomo (for the Petitioners) Frederick Liu (for the Respondents) Christopher E. Mills (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below on Question 1) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In October 2017, six FBI agents, led by Special Agent Lawrence Guerra, mistakenly executed a no-knock search warrant at the home of Curtrina Martin and her family in Atlanta, Georgia. The intended target was a nearby home suspected to contain violent gang member Joseph Riley. Due to similarities between the two properties and issues with navigating to the correct address, the agents entered Martin’s home instead. The SWAT team, in full tactical gear, entered the house, causing fear and distress to its occupants. They later realized the mistake and promptly left the scene, later apologizing and assuring the family that the FBI would handle any damages. Martin and her family sued the U.S. government and the agents, claiming violations of their Fourth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Georgia state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision, ruling that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity and that the Federal Tort Claims Act claims were barred by the Supremacy Clause and the discretionary function exception. Question 1. Does the Supremacy Clause prevent individuals from suing the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act when federal employees’ actions, even if negligent or wrongful, are related to carrying out federal policy and can be interpreted as following federal laws? 2. Is the discretionary-function exception, which usually protects the government from being sued for certain decisions made by its employees, always inapplicable when dealing with claims related to law enforcement officers’ actions that fall under the intentional torts category?

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• [24-304] Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis

  Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2025. Petitioner: Luke Davis.Respondent: Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Deepak Gupta (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Julian Vargas, who is blind, encountered inaccessible check-in kiosks at LabCorp facilities. Vargas attempted to use these kiosks but was unable due to their lack of accessibility for visually impaired individuals. As a result, he had to wait for assistance from a staff member, which delayed his check-in and denied him equal access to services such as maintaining his spot in the queue or updating personal information privately. Vargas claimed that this lack of accessibility infringed on his rights under disability laws, leading to the lawsuit. The district court certified two classes: a California class for Unruh Civil Rights Act claims and a nationwide class for claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Affordable Care Act. LabCorp appealed the class certification, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Question May a federal court certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury?

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• [24-249] A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279

  A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279 Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2025. Petitioner: A.J.T.Respondent: Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A.J.T., a student with epilepsy, experiences seizures so severe in the morning that she cannot attend school until noon. Her parents repeatedly requested evening instruction from Osseo Area Schools to give her a school day length more comparable to her peers. Despite the District providing some accommodations, including one-on-one instruction, a slightly extended school day, and summer home instruction sessions, they denied the requests for evening instruction. The District’s Director of Student Services, responsible for Section 504 compliance, was unaware of the parents’ complaints and did not know that District policies allowed at-home schooling as an accommodation. A.J.T., through her parents, sued the District for disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Do the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education?

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• [24-320] Soto v. United States

  Soto v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2025. Petitioner: Simon A. Soto.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Tacy F. Flint (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran with a combat-related disability, was medically retired in 2006 with less than 20 years of service. Although he became eligible for Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) in 2009 when he received his disability rating, he did not apply until 2016. The Navy used the Barring Act’s six-year limitation period to calculate his retroactive payments, giving him payments dating back only to 2010 instead of to 2008 when Congress had expanded CRSC eligibility to veterans with less than 20 years of service. Soto filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated veterans who received only six years of back payments, arguing that the CRSC statute’s own procedures should apply instead of the Barring Act’s six-year limit. The district court granted summary judgment to Soto’s class, holding that the CRSC statute was more specific and therefore superseded the Barring Act. The court also applied the pro-veteran canon of statutory interpretation, resolving any doubt in favor of the veterans. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. Question When disabled combat veterans claim past-due compensation, should the military use the CRSC statute's rules to calculate how far back they can be paid, or should it use the Barring Act's six-year limit?

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