The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc.
29/04/2026
Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 24-889

24-889 HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS V. AMARIN PHARMA, INC.
DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1370
CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act "[t]o facilitate the approval of generic drugs as
soon as patents allow."
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S
, 566 U.S. 399, 405
(2012). Recognizing that many drugs are approved for both patented and unpatented uses,
Congress sought to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug
for other unpatented ones."
Id
. at 415. The statutory mechanism is a "skinny label": Generic
drugmakers "carve out" patented uses from their labels, leaving only instructions to use
generic drugs for their unpatented uses. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
Congress designed this carve-out mechanism to encourage competition and to protect
generic drugmakers from allegations that marketing a generic drug for an unpatented use
"actively induces infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). After all, active inducement requires "clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement"-there is no "liability when a
defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use."
Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
, 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 & n.11 (2005).
The questions presented are:
1. When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the
generic drugmaker calls its product a "generic version" and cites public information about the
branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use?
2. Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it
does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or
even mentions, the patented use?

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2023-1169
Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe
29/04/2026
Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 25-1083

25-1083 MULLIN, SEC. DHS V. DOE
DECISION BELOW:
CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION FOR STAY (25A952) PRESENTED TO JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR AND BY HER REFERRED TO THE COURT IS DEFERRED. CONSIDERATION OF THE
APPLICATION FOR STAY (25A999) PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO
THE COURT IS ALSO DEFERRED. THE APPLICATIONS ARE ALSO TREATED AS PETITIONS FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT (25-1083, 25-1084), AND THE PETITIONS ARE
GRANTED. THE CASES ARE CONSOLIDATED, AND A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR IS ALLOTTED FOR
ORAL ARGUMENT.
CERT. GRANTED 3/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-2995
Cisco Systems v. Doe I
28/04/2026
Cisco Systems v. Doe I | 04/28/26 | Docket #: 24-856

24-856 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. V. DOE I
DECISION BELOW: 73 F.4th 700
GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 3 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
CERT. GRANTED 1/9/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
1.

Whether the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows a judicially-implied
private right of action for aiding and abetting.
2.

Whether, if ATS aiding-and-abetting claims are cognizable, mere knowledge rather than
purpose suffices to show the requisite
mens rea.
3.

Whether the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, allows a judicially-
implied private right of action for aiding and abetting.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 15-16909
Monsanto Co. v. Durnell
27/04/2026
Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | 04/27/26 | Docket #: 24-1068

24-1068 MONSANTO CO. V. DURNELL
DECISION BELOW: 707 S.W.3d 828
GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:
WHETHER THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT PREEMPTS A LABEL-
BASED FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIM WHERE EPA HAS NOT REQUIRED THE WARNING.
CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA'') creates a
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the use, sale, and labeling of pesticides. The Act
preempts any state "requirement[] for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from
those required under" FIFRA.

7 U.S.C. §136v(b). For decades, EPA has exercised its authority
under FIFRA to find that Monsanto's Roundup product line and its active ingredient,
glyphosate, do not cause cancer in humans. Consistent with that understanding, EPA has
repeatedly approved Roundup's label without a cancer warning. FIFRA prohibits Monsanto
from making any substantive change to an EPA-approved label unless it first obtains EPA's
permission.
Respondent is one of more than 100,000 plaintiffs across the country that nonetheless
seek to hold Monsanto liable for not warning users that glyphosate, the active ingredient in
Roundup, causes cancer. The federal courts of appeals and state appellate courts are divided
over whether FIFRA preempts such claims. The Third Circuit has held that it does. In the
decision below, the Missouri Court of Appeals joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and state
appellate courts in California and Oregon in holding that it does not.
The question presented is:
Whether FIFRA preempts a state-law failure-to- warn claim where EPA has repeatedly
concluded that the warning is not required and the warning cannot be added to a product
without EPA approval.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: ED112410
Chatrie v. United States
27/04/2026
Chatrie v. United States | 04/27/26 | Docket #: 25-112

25-112 CHATRIE V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 136 F.4th 100
LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
This case concerns the constitutionality of geofence warrants. For cell phone users to
use certain services, their cell phones must continuously transmit their exact locations to their
service providers. A geofence warrant allows law enforcement to obtain, from the service
provider, the identities of users who were in the vicinity of a particular location at a particular
time.
In this case, law enforcement obtained, and served on Google, a geofence warrant
seeking anonymized location data for every device within 150 meters of the location of a bank
robbery within one hour of the robbery. After Google returned an initial list, law enforcement
sought - without seeking an additional warrant - information about the movements of certain
devices for a longer, two-hour period, and Google complied with that request as well. Then -
again without seeking an additional warrant-law enforcement requested de-anonymized
subscriber information for three devices. One of those devices belonged to petitioner Okello
Chatrie. Based on the evidence derived from the geofence warrant, petitioner was convicted of
armed robbery.
The questions presented are:
1.

Whether the execution of the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
2.

Whether the exclusionary rule should apply to the evidence derived from the geofence
warrant.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-4489

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