The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan | 10/07/26 | Docket #: 25-579

25-579 DEPT. OF AIR FORCE V. GUAHAN
DECISION BELOW: 128 F.4th 1089
CERT. GRANTED 3/9/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901
et seq
., is a
comprehensive environmental statute providing for cradle-to-grave regulation of hazardous
waste through a scheme of cooperative federalism. Under RCRA, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency may authorize state and territorial regulators to administer
permitting programs for hazardous-waste-treatment facilities in their respective jurisdictions,
including facilities operated by the federal government. The questions presented are as
follows:
1. Whether the federal government's submission to a state or territorial regulator of an
application to renew a RCRA permit is "final agency action" that is immediately reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704.
2. Whether the federal government must comply with the general environmental-
review procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321
et seq
.,
before submitting a permit-renewal application under RCRA, which sets forth its own specific
procedures to review environmental impacts in the context of hazardous-waste treatment.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16613

Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee | 10/06/26 | Docket #: 25-498

25-498 ANDERSON V. INTEL CORP. INV.
DECISION BELOW: 137 F.4th 1015
CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan fiduciary is
subject to a "[p]rudent man standard of care," which requires the fiduciary to "discharge his
duties with respect to a plan" with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent
person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)
(1)). As this Court has recognized, a court's inquiry into whether a plaintiff has adequately
alleged that a fiduciary breached ERISA's duty of prudence "will necessarily be context specific"
because the content of that duty "turns on 'the circumstances ... prevailing' at the time the
fiduciary acts."
Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer
, 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). As a result, "categorical" pleading rules are "inconsistent with the
context-specific inquiry that ERISA requires."
Hughes v. Nw. Univ
., 595 U.S.170, 173 (2022).
The question presented is: Whether, for claims predicated on fund underperformance,
pleading that an ERISA fiduciary failed to use the requisite "care, skill, prudence, or diligence"
under the circumstances and thus breached ERISA's duty of prudence when investing plan
assets requires alleging a "meaningful benchmark."
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-16268

Johnson v. United States Congress | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-735

25-735 JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES CONGRESS
DECISION BELOW: 151 F.4th 1287
CERT. GRANTED 4/6/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Did the Veterans' Judicial Review Act strip district courts of the jurisdiction, recognized
by this Court in
Johnson v. Robison
, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), to hear challenges to the
constitutionality of acts of Congress affecting veterans' benefits?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10682

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Commissioners of Boulder County | 10/05/26 | Docket #: 25-170

25-170 SUNCOR ENERGY, INC. V. COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1363355
IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THE PETITION, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO
BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS COURT HAS STATUTORY AND
ARTICLE III JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS CASE.
SEPTEMBER
28
,
2026
:
JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE.

 
CERT. GRANTED 2/23/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether federal law precludes state-law claims seeking relief for injuries allegedly
caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global
climate.

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24SA206

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | 04/29/26 | Docket #: 24-889

24-889 HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS V. AMARIN PHARMA, INC.
DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1370
CERT. GRANTED 1/16/2026
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act "[t]o facilitate the approval of generic drugs as
soon as patents allow."
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S
, 566 U.S. 399, 405
(2012). Recognizing that many drugs are approved for both patented and unpatented uses,
Congress sought to ensure "that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug
for other unpatented ones."
Id
. at 415. The statutory mechanism is a "skinny label": Generic
drugmakers "carve out" patented uses from their labels, leaving only instructions to use
generic drugs for their unpatented uses. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
Congress designed this carve-out mechanism to encourage competition and to protect
generic drugmakers from allegations that marketing a generic drug for an unpatented use
"actively induces infringement." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). After all, active inducement requires "clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement"-there is no "liability when a
defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use."
Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
, 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 & n.11 (2005).
The questions presented are:
1. When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the
generic drugmaker calls its product a "generic version" and cites public information about the
branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use?
2. Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it
does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or
even mentions, the patented use?

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2023-1169